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Abstract: Capital-constrained cooperatives are being challenged by producer-
members to provide vertical integration opportunities. We find evidence producer 
groups are utilizing an investment strategy described as spawning. Producer-investors 
familiar with a particular organizational form and who have developed joint investment 
networks were more apt to invest in newly spawned ventures.  
 
 
Key words: Spawning, Collective Entrepreneurship, Cooperative Development 
 
 
                                                
1
 University of Missouri, BurressM@missouri.edu 
2
 University of Missouri, CookML@missouri.edu 
 2 
1. The Role of Existing Entities in the Creation of New Cooperative Ventures 
Strategies of diversification, merger, acquisition, strategic alliances, and the 
establishment of capital-seeking entities are well-recognized as options for maintaining 
cooperative competitiveness and mitigating financial constraints (Merlo, 1998; Crooks, 
2000; Richards and Manfredo, 2003; Chaddad and Cook, 2004). However, observation 
of the dynamic cooperative sector suggests an important aspect of cooperative trends 
has been under-documented. We observe a new approach to sustaining competitiveness 
without exacerbating financial constraints or creating additional control problems. 
Specifically, we note that existing cooperatives have played an important role in the 
creation of new, separate organizational structures that seek to enhance the value of 
members‟ products. The role that existing cooperatives and producer-controlled 
organizations play in the creation of new cooperative organizations is not explained nor 
captured by existing theory. We present the notion of spawning as a framework to 
improve our understanding of these current dynamics. 
The notion that existing producer-owned entities may affect the emergence of 
new cooperative ventures is not a foreign concept. However, this link has escaped 
formal academic inquiry. We observe existing cooperatives encourage and invest in the 
development of similar organizations across their regions, but have few tools with 
which to incorporate these dynamics into our models of cooperative development. 
Consequently, the impact of organizational ties and “early models of cooperative 
success” are recognized in practitioners‟ accounts, but seldom in academic literature 
(University of Manitoba).  
2. Spawning: New Organizational Arrangements to Attract Risk Capital  
Literature from entrepreneurship and finance suggest entrepreneurial ties among 
cooperatives may best be described as spawning or swarming (Daval, 2002; Gompers, 
Lerner and Scharfstein, 2005). Spawning and swarming differ from previous corporate 
entrepreneurship models such as the spin-off. A spin-off often evolves from a business 
unit within an existing organization. Spawning or swarming frameworks, however, 
analyze ventures initially created as separate business entities. The link between the 
parent organization and the spawned entity are the members or employees of the parent 
organization involved in venture creation. 
 
2.1 Spawning vs. Swarming 
Spawning refers to a process where persons formerly affiliated with a „parent‟ 
firm organize a separate entrepreneurial venture (Gompers, et al., 2005). Swarming 
describes a parent organization‟s role in fostering an emerging enterprise. Unlike 
swarming, the notion of spawning allows us to consider parents that may have been tacit 
or unwilling participants in the creation of the new firm. Gompers et al. (2005) develop 
a theoretical framework to explain spawning. This framework is utilized to determine 
why employees choose to develop an entrepreneurial opportunity outside an existing 
organization. The authors find two general motivations for spawning: reactionary and 
entrepreneurial.  
 
2.2 Reactionary Spawning 
Reactionary spawning occurs when an employee or group of employees leaves 
the firm to develop an idea the parent is unable or unwilling to pursue (Gompers, et al., 
2005).  The reactionary firm is epitomized as the offspring of a large organization that 
 3 
does not seize the chance to develop an entrepreneurial opportunity. The parent 
organization may be reluctant to pursue an entrepreneurial endeavor because it wisely 
chooses to focus on its core competencies. Alternatively, the parent‟s hierarchical 
decision-making processes and rigid internal capital markets may render the 
organization slow to respond to market changes. These large, bureaucratic organizations 
may have difficulty processing “soft” information.  Therefore, managers may 
experience difficulty evaluating entrepreneurial opportunities.   
 
2.3 Entrepreneurial Spawning 
The second type of spawned entity can be characterized as an entrepreneurial 
learner. Entrepreneurial learning entities are spawned from younger, smaller 
organizations that have been venture capital backed. The hypothesis is that employees 
in these organizations have relationships with suppliers and customers in the industry, 
business start-up experience, knowledge of the venture creation process, and network 
contacts that facilitate venture creation. In addition, individuals affiliated with start-up 
firms may have a higher tolerance for risk.  
 
3. Application of the Spawning Framework to the Creation of Cooperative 
Enterprise 
The most notable difference between the application of the traditional spawning 
framework and our present application is a shift in the unit of analysis. While traditional 
application of the spawning framework utilizes the employee as the primary unit of 
analysis, we analyze individual member producers. Gompers et al. (2005) analyze 
employees because it is their decision to create and invest in a new firm. Among 
agricultural cooperatives, the producer-owner is making this initial creation and 
investment decision. 
Although researchers have uncovered significant empirical evidence of 
spawning among publicly-traded firms, we know of no previous literature that has 
sought to determine whether cooperatives spawn. Therefore, our analysis begins by 
identifying cases of spawning among cooperatives. If spawning occurs, we seek to 
determine 1) whether the analytical framework of the spawning theory can improve our 
understanding of the evolution of entrepreneurial producer groups in the cooperative 
sector, 2) the exact mechanisms by which spawning takes place, and 3) factors that 
increase the likelihood of spawning. 
In addition to building a theory of spawning applicable to cooperatives, we are 
interested in expanding the theory of spawning to resolve questions unaddressed by the 
spawning framework. We are primarily interested in the financial motivations for 
spawning. Gompers et al. (2005) stress reactionary and entrepreneurial spawning as 
avenues for an individual to develop a new opportunity. However, they do not address 
the possibility that an entrepreneur may be motivated by residual claimant rights in the 
new venture.  
In addition, we would like to delve deeper into the reasons behind 
entrepreneurial spawning. The reactionary story is quite clear. The business idea had to 
be developed outside the parent because the parent was unwilling or unable to pursue 
the idea. In the case of an entrepreneurial spawn, we note the theory does not explain an 
entrepreneur‟s motivation for choosing to pursue a business opportunity outside the 
parent organization.  
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4. Hypotheses Resulting from Initial Observations of Active Spawning  
Cooperatives are continuously striving to link producers to markets. Producer-
members may choose to develop business opportunities within the cooperative or as a 
separate business entity. Descriptive histories of several cooperatives reviewed mirror 
the generic descriptions presented in the spawning theory. To begin our inquiry, we 
present basic hypotheses from the spawning framework, tailored to cooperative 
enterprise. We hypothesize that reactionary ventures are likely to emerge from a parent 
who chooses to focus on core competencies, as a reaction against bureaucratic or 
inefficient organizations with rigid internal capital markets, or from a parent unable to 
process soft information to value uncertain opportunities. We hypothesize that 
entrepreneurial learning ventures are likely to emerge from individuals with established 
industry-specific contacts, knowledge of the venture creation process, experience 
utilizing venture networks, or with a higher risk tolerance. 
5. Method and Procedures 
We utilize a deviant case method embedded in a cross-case comparison to test 
the presence and nature of spawning against a set of theory-driven constructs. Research 
describes a construct-based inquiry as most effective for our purpose of theory building 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Emigh, 1997). Table 1 identifies the constructs, their expected sign 
according to the stated hypotheses, the name of the variable representing the construct, 
and a synopsis of the survey item from which the data on each variable was gathered.  
The data analyzed includes 150 interviews over a 13-year period compiled by 4 
researchers, 207 written survey responses from individual producers and investors, and 
extensive correspondence with cooperative organizers. An initial review of descriptive 
histories indicated two cooperatives under initial investigation exhibited strong ties to a 
single county in Minnesota: ValAdCo and Golden Oval (GOE). This provided us with 
an excellent opportunity to investigate individual producer investment choices while 
holding institutional context constant. In addition, primary and secondary sources 
corroborated a more reactionary environment during the development of ValAdCo. 
Therefore, we were able to test for differences with respect to the reasons each entity 
was spawned.  
ValAdCo was created as an organization to add value to members‟ corn. 
ValAdCo organizers developed an intensive sow multiplier unit utilizing corn as the 
main feed input for sows. GOE also focused on adding value to members‟ corn. 
Organizers looked to accomplish this through a significant investment in laying 
operations.
 
 
We survey potential investors from a common parent organization regarding 
their decision to invest resources in a spawned cooperative entity. Although three 
potential parent organizations were tested, we present here binary logistic regression 
results from the parent exhibiting the greatest statistical significance. A variety of 
constructs were included in the instrument as a means to inform the spawning 
framework as it may apply to cooperatives. The model for each organization, ValAdCo 
and GOE, is estimated separately. The models utilized test the log odds of a producer‟s 
decision to invest given a set of independent variables derived from the following 
spawning framework where variables x1…xk correspond to the independent variables 
listed in Table 1: 
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6. Relevant Empirical Findings 
We find significant empirical support for spawning among agricultural 
cooperatives. Both ValAdCo and GOE exhibited strong organizational ties in the form 
of previous membership in a single “parent” organization. The strongest predictors of 
investment in a spawned entity can be described as joint investment networks. 
Producers previously engaged in some form of joint investment were more apt to invest 
during subsequent rounds of producer cooperation. Familiarity with the organizational 
structure utilized, particularly with regards to informal organizational rules, was also a 
strong predictor of investment. In the case of ValAdCo, producers with established 
business networks among partner-investors exhibited greater tendencies to invest. 
Regression results reflect greater entrepreneurial, rather than reactionary, reasons for 
spawning for both cooperatives studied. Table 2 presents reference models for those 
specifications that best informed a producer‟s decision to invest.  
 
6.1 Hypothesis 1: Reactionary spawning due to the parent’s focus on core 
competencies 
The survey instrument utilized several constructs to investigate whether tension 
between a focus on core competencies and diversification may have lead to the creation 
of the spawned entity. None of these variables exhibited a statistically significant 
correlation. 
 
6.2  Hypothesis 2: Reactionary spawning due to a bureaucratic parent 
Survey respondents were asked whether bureaucracy within the parent 
organization impacted the decision to spawn. Constructs specifically investigated slow 
reactions to market changes, internal capital market disagreements and costly 
negotiation processes (Hansmann, 1996). Internal capital market and negotiation 
constructs did not show significance.    
However, respondents indicating the parent organization was slow to reach an 
investment decision on previous projects were more likely to invest in the spawned 
entity. For each unit increase in the amount of organizational lethargy identified by 
respondents, the log odds of investment in ValAdCo and GOE generally increased by 
factors of 1.3 and 1.1, respectively
3
. Empirical results indicate inclusion of this criterion 
does not improve the model‟s ability to predict investment in the case of ValAdCo.  
Therefore, this variable is excluded from the ValAdCo Reference Model in Table 2.  
 
6.3 Hypothesis 3: Reactionary spawning due to disagreement over investment 
outcome 
The strongest evidence we find to differentiate between spawning motivations 
experienced by ValAdCo and GOE pertains to the degree of disagreement perceived 
among investors at the level of the parent organization. In the case of GOE, the 
“Disagreement” variable did not improve the model‟s ability to predict investment and 
generally showed a negative correlation with investment. In the case of ValAdCo, for 
each unit increase in the level of controversy potential investors recognized within the 
parent organization, the log odds of investment increased by a factor of 1.729. This is an 
especially strong finding because the sample as a whole perceived high levels of 
disagreement within the parent organization over whether to invest in a multiplier unit. 
                                                
3
 These results refer to the variable name “Before” referenced in Tables 1 and 2. 
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Investors, however, consistently indicated higher levels of controversy. ValAdCo 
investors appear to have been motivated to invest in the spawned organization due to a 
failure of the parent organization to pursue the venture. 
Part of the disagreement over whether to invest stemmed from heterogeneous 
member investment preferences with respect to farm level assets. Potential investors 
often expressed concern that newly organized ventures would constitute a competitive 
threat to their on-farm production. Empirical results in the case of ValAdCo and GOE 
both indicate a negative correlation between the investors‟ assessment of the 
competitive threat, indicated by the variable “Compete,” and investment. For each unit 
increase in the level of competition the respondent perceived the new venture to 
represent, the log odds of investment decreased by 0.669 (ValAdCo) and 0.804 (GOE).  
We found two categories of respondents concerned that emerging ventures 
would constitute increased competitive pressure (1) respondents engaged in the hog or 
poultry sectors, (2) net grain buyers. Respondents involved more generally in animal 
agriculture often fell into both categories. These producers considered the parent 
organization‟s involvement in either venture would increase feed prices, thus increasing 
competitive pressure.  
 
6.4  Hypothesis 4: Entrepreneurial Spawning supported by industry-specific contacts 
Respondents were asked to indicate previous experience with hogs, poultry, and 
laying operations
4
. Previous industry experience showed no significance and a slight 
negative correlation. This result is contrary to an entrepreneurial learning hypothesis. 
However, further case analysis explains this result.  
Several respondents indicated the ValAdCo venture posed a competitive threat 
to their on-farm operation. Therefore, the majority of respondents with experience in the 
hog industry were in the subset of non-investors. With respect to GOE investments, 
83% of respondents indicated they had no experience with broiler or laying hen 
operations. Another 5% indicated 10 years of involvement or less in the industry. The 
concept of a venture involving eggs or poultry was attractive to investors specifically 
because very few area farmers were involved in a sizable poultry operation. GOE 
investors indicated fewer area farmers would perceive this venture to be competing with 
their on-farm operation. For this reason, investors expected the venture to attract less 
controversy from neighboring farms. 
 
6.5  Hypothesis 5: Entrepreneurial spawning through prior knowledge of venturing  
Although the majority of respondents were single or single-family proprietors of 
their farming operations, few indicated experience starting a new business. Therefore, 
the data showed little correlation between previous venture experience and the 
propensity to invest in the spawned entity. 
ValAdCo and GOE both utilized a unique organizational structure. Therefore, 
we include an additional variable important to our analysis: familiarity with the 
structure and functioning of the New Generation Cooperative (NGC). The variable 
“Pay2Play” assessed whether previous experience with the NGC organizational 
                                                
4
 General experience in small animal agriculture does not necessarily translate into the specific skills 
needed to manage a large sow multiplying operation or laying barns.  However, even this minimum 
experience was rare among respondents.  Less than 5 respondents indicated any significant investment in 
hogs; none indicated any form of specialization at the time of the ValAdCo venture.  Regarding broiler or 
layer operations, only one respondent indicated any significant investment.  
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structure impacted investment. The results indicate for each unit increase in the 
respondent‟s familiarity with the organizational structure the log odds of investment 
increase by a factor of 2.2 (ValAdCo) and 1.3 (GOE). Individual respondent‟s 
investment patterns corroborate this result: approximately 60% of investors in both 
organizations had previously invested in a NGC.  
 
6.6 Hypothesis 6: Entrepreneurial spawning due to experience utilizing venture 
networks 
Our analysis of venture creation networks looked at three categories of ties 
among investors in these collective ventures: 1) social networks within both the parent 
and the spawned entities, 2) business networks within the parent and the spawned 
entities, and 3) comfort gained through repeated used of joint investment networks. By 
including separate social and business network variables for each organization we are 
able to investigate which type of ties have the strongest impact on venture development. 
The spawning framework leads us to predict that higher levels of networking with 
individuals investing in ValAdCO or GOE would result in a higher probability of 
investing in each of those organizations, respectively. In addition, we would expect 
strong network ties to the parent organization to lend support to the notion of a parent-
spawn relationship.   
 
6.6.1  Social Capital 
Measures of social capital were generally negative and insignificant for both 
organizations across model specifications. This holds true for social capital in each 
venture and the parent organization.  
 
6.6.2  Business Network    
Empirical results indicate previous business relationships among fellow 
investors are a more reliable predictor of investment than social capital. For each unit 
increase in the respondent‟s rating of the strength of business relationships with fellow 
investors, the log odds of investment increased by 2.07 in the case of ValAdCo. For, 
GOE, the business network variable was generally positive, but not significant. GOE 
was a larger organization with more investors. For a larger organization, it is less likely 
that a large number of members will all be considered part of a respondent‟s business 
network. 
The analysis of business networks among investors in the parent organization 
provided results contrary to a strict interpretation of the spawning hypothesis. In the 
case of both ValAdCo and GOE, potential investors who perceived strong business 
networks within the parent organization were less likely to invest in an emerging 
venture. However, GOE model specifications including the construct did not improve 
the model‟s ability to predict investment and are not included here.  
In the case of ValAdCo, for each unit increase in the strength of business 
connections a respondent reported to exist within the parent organization, the log odds 
of investment decreased by a factor of 0.5. This finding might explain, from a 
socioeconomic standpoint, why ValAdCo investors proceeded to invest even though a 
majority of parent organization members rejected the multiplier unit idea. ValAdCo 
investors were less likely to have strong business connections to fellow parent 
cooperative members. Therefore, they were less likely to suffer negative consequences 
or jeopardize existing business relationships due to an investment in ValAdCo. The case 
of ValAdCo provides an example of how the absence or rejection of certain networks 
may also lead to the emergence of entrepreneurship.   
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6.6.3  Joint Investment Networks 
The network variables most accurate in predicting investment were those 
assessing previous interaction in the form of joint investment networks. The variable 
“Comfort” assessed whether respondents had worked with fellow investors before and 
whether they were comfortable investing with them. For each unit increase in a 
respondent‟s level of comfort with fellow investors, log odds of investment increased by 
a factor of 2.3 (ValAdCo) and 1.8 (GOE).  The empirical results regarding “Comfort” 
suggest previous joint investment experience may facilitate the emergence of collective 
entrepreneurship. These investment networks are significant in both spawned entities 
and present even when respondents do not consider they maintain more direct business 
network ties.  
 
6.7 Hypothesis 7: Entrepreneurial spawning to capture or control distribution of 
residual claims 
The final set of variables for the entrepreneurial learning spawn hypothesis dealt 
with the question “why spawn”?  In the Gompers et al. (2005) spawning framework, 
reactionary spawning arises due to an inability to pursue the venture within the parent 
organization. However, there is no theoretical reason given as to why entrepreneurial 
offspring establish a separate business entity. If we find entrepreneurial learners gained 
networks and experience from an organization and can argue that organization is costly, 
we are left to question why entrepreneurs would break away from the existing 
organization to form a new organization. When a new organization is founded there are 
certain costs involved in terms of set up including legal fees, permitting, and 
incorporation. The organization must also establish a new set of rules and governing 
procedures. Certain of these costs could be mitigated or avoided all together if the entity 
were developed within the organization. What, then, is the benefit to entrepreneurial 
spawning? 
After initial interviews to explore potential hypotheses as to why an organization 
might break away, a set of survey items was developed to explore this question. The 
ValAdCo venture was rejected by a membership vote within the parent, therefore, these 
variables do not apply to ValAdCo. Additional constructs included for GOE 
demonstrate respondents valued establishing a separate entity in order to preserve (1) 
investment choice and (2) residual control rights.  
 
6.7.1 Investment Choice 
Investors and non-investors alike welcomed the establishment of a separate 
organizational entity so that they could make an individual decision whether to invest or 
not. Because this ability to choose was cited as an important reason for spawning by 
investors (84.5%) and non-investors (62.4%) alike, it does not exhibit significance 
within the binary regression format. Descriptive statistics underscore the importance of 
investment choice, not in the decision to invest, but rather in the decision to spawn. 
 
6.7.1 Residual Control Rights 
With respect to “Control” we examined whether investors were interested in 
spawning as a means to maintain control of venture management. If GOE were to 
remain a part of the parent organization, Co-op Country, individuals who did not invest 
directly in GOE through share purchase may have had an impact on GOE decision-
making. Co-op Country maintains a one-member, one-vote structure. Establishing GOE 
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as a separate organization would enable investors to retain greater control of the 
organization.   
Contrary to a control hypothesis, the ability to exercise control over venture 
management demonstrated a significant, negative correlation among investors. For each 
unit increase in the level of control a respondent indicated was gained by developing 
GOE as a separate organization, the log odds of investment decreased by a factor of 
0.775.  This finding indicates investors were not highly focused on control and 
monitoring of the organization. Previous analysis of GOE indicated that this 
organization was an agent-driven organization, primarily interested in residual claims 
(as opposed to residual control) (Chambers, 2007). Respondents perceived little 
previous experience in the laying industry and had what they described to be more of an 
investment club mentality when investing in GOE. The separate organizational structure 
primarily facilitated the capture of residuals by the shareholders and allowed for 
individual investment choice.   
 
6.8 Hypothesis 8: Entrepreneurial spawning among individuals with higher risk 
tolerance 
Individuals with higher risk tolerance would be more likely to be involved in 
new venture creation according to the spawning framework. To test this hypothesis, we 
asked respondents to indicate the level of risk they perceived when investing in the 
spawned entity. Those with a higher risk tolerance would perceive relatively lower 
levels of risk. We expect a negative correlation between a respondents‟ perception of 
the level of investment risk and their willingness to invest.   
Perception of investment risk was a significant predictor of investment. For each 
unit increase in the level of risk perceived by investors, the log odds of investment 
decreased by a factor of 0.588 (ValAdCo) and 0.562 (GOE). Thus, we conclude 
individuals perceiving less risk or more comfortable with the assumption of this risk 
were more likely to be engaged in spawning new ventures.  
7. Implications 
The notion of spawning is found to have significant descriptive power in 
explaining the relationship between existing agricultural cooperatives and newly 
emerging cooperatives.  We chose to further investigate the exact ties or components of 
this relationship that spur the development of new cooperatives. By analyzing the 
individual producer‟s investment decision, we found existing cooperatives primarily 
encourage spawning by providing producers with repeated opportunities to develop 
joint investment networks as they collaborate to fund new ventures. Previous 
knowledge and experience with the specific organizational structure of investment also 
presents itself as a strong predictor of investment. Existing cooperatives transfer this 
knowledge through specific mechanisms such as membership requirements, contractual 
arrangements, investment opportunities, and board responsibilities.  
Both spawned entities indicated controversy within the parent organization or 
the parent organization‟s inability to respond quickly to entrepreneurial opportunities 
motivated their decision to create a separate organization. While investors were not 
necessarily motivated to spawn by an interest in maintaining investor-control over the 
management of the organization, investors and non-investors alike put a premium on 
being given the choice to invest at an individual level and maintaining a transparent 
residual distribution mechanism. 
In subsequent articles we plan to elaborate further on the costs and benefits of 
spawning to the individual producer and to the existing cooperative entity. Our current 
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research program continues to investigate several mechanisms that parents and spawned 
entities can utilize to attract risk capital, protect their existing organizations, create exit 
strategies, and foster successful alliances. 
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Table 1. Independent Spawning Constructs Tested 
Hypothesis Expected Sign Variable Construct Description Result 
H1 + Focus · Parent should focus Not significant 
H1 + Too Diverse · Parent would become too diversified Not significant 
H2 + Slow · Parent slow to react to market Not significant 
H2 + Preferences · Diverse, competing member preferences Not significant 
H2 + Before · Parent exhibited slow decision-making 
process  
Not significant, ValAdCo  
+ GOE 
H2 + Funds · Internal capital market disagreement Not significant 
H2 + Residual · Impact of internal capital market decisions 
on member wealth 
Not significant 
H3 + Disagreement · Disagreement over venture investment 
outcome 
+ValAdCo 
Not significant, GOE 
H3 + Reluctant · Parent reluctant to engage in uncertain 
venture 
Not significant 
H3 - Compete 
· Individual member considered venture 
posed competition or decreased returns to 
producer‟s on-farm investment 
- ValAdCo 
- GOE 
H4 + Hog Exp · Experience in the hog industry Not significant 
H4 + Egg Exp · Experience in the poultry or layer business Not significant 
H5 + Bus Exp · Prior venture start-up experience  Not significant 
H5 + Pay2Play · Structure-Specific experience (i.e. 
familiarity with NGC structure) 
+ ValAdCo 
+ GOE 
H6 + Comfort · Prior Use of joint investment networks 
+ ValAdCo 
+ GOE 
H6 + Social · Investors perceived social ties to fellow 
investors in ValAdCo or GOE 
Not significant 
H6 
+ 
 
Bus Network · Investors perceived business ties to fellows 
investors in ValAdCo or GOE  
+ValAdCo  
Not significant, GOE 
H6 + CC Social · Investors perceived social ties to fellow 
members of parent organization 
Not significant 
H6 + CC Business · Investors perceived business ties to fellow 
members of parent organization 
- ValAdCo 
Not Significant, GOE 
H7 + Control 
· Investors perceived greater control over 
management of organization establish 
separately from parent 
ValAdCo, not applicable 
+GOE 
H8 - Risky · Investor‟s perception of risk level 
- ValAdCo 
- GOE 
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Table 2. Binary Logistic Regression Results                                                                       
  
 Reference Model: ValAdCo  Reference Model: GOE 
Variable B Exp(B) Sig.  B Exp(B) Sig. 
Constant  -7.045 .001 .001  .071 1.073 .958 
Bus Network .728 2.072 .002  --- --- --- 
Pay2Play .798 2.220 .000  .326 1.385 .026 
Comfort .867 2.381 .000  .475 1.608 .001 
Compete -.403 .669 .015  -.218 .804 .125 
Disagreement .547 1.729 .021  --- --- --- 
CC Business -.747 .474 .001  --- --- --- 
Risky -.531 .588 .004  -.577 .562 .000 
Control --- --- ---  -.255 .775 .102 
Before --- --- ---  .170 1.185 .334 
Model Chi-Sq  110.632 (sig) .000   72.732 (sig) .000 
-2LL   78.159    140.523 
% Correct   91.8%    80.5% 
 
